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Abstract
In the past few years, unstable and extreme weather patterns are increasingly
occurring as phenomena of climate change, and the link to greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions is scientifically accepted. From an economic point of view, extreme weather
patterns are causing major damage to health, property, and business.
In this chapter, following an economic analysis of law (EAL) approach, the issue of
the comparison between the alternative environmental economic policies is analyzed
starting from the consideration that the emissions of GHGs originate market failures:
the environment appears as a “public good” that may not be appropriated and has
no market price; the damage to the environment is a case of “externality,” where it is
fully or partly a social cost that is not internalized into the accounts of the parties
causing it. In the EAL literature, an environmental policy instrument has been seen
as it may play a role in correcting malfunction and subsequent inefficiencies.
In the first part of the chapter, we intend to revise the traditional analysis of the choice
of environmental policies. The following part deals with the comparison between tax
and tradable permit systems. Then the role that can be played by the insurance sector
is considered. The different policy instruments are considered in the framework of
climate as an economic global public good. And, finally, some conclusive remarks are
presented in relation to the COP 21 conference in Paris in terms of the future policies
against GHG effects.
Keywords: climate change, environmental policy choice, insurance, greenhouse gasses,
COP 21
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1. Introduction
Over the last centuries, climate change has been raised as a very important issue all over the
world. The change in climate results from an increase in the earth’s average atmospheric
temperature, which is usually referred to as global warming. It may be due to both natural
and human causes, especially greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.
In response to increasing scientific evidence that human activities are contributing significantly
to global climate change [1], decision makers are devoting considerable attention to public
policies to reduce GHG emissions and thereby prevent or reduce such change.
The policies span a range of regulatory approaches. The main alternative is between command
and control (CAC) and market-based (MB) instruments, and a relevant role can also be played
by the insurance sector.
This chapter aims to describe the traditional theory on the choice of environmental policies
following an economic analysis of law (EAL) approach (Section 2) to analyze the comparison
between tax and tradable permit systems (Section 3), to outline the role of the insurance sector
(Section 4), and to consider the different policy instruments in a context of economic global
public goods. The final objective is to take into account the future COP 21 conference in Paris
in terms of the choice of policy instruments against GHG effects.
2. The traditional issue of the choice of environmental policies
The problem of the choice of environmental policy instruments has been an issue since Pigou
[2] analyzed the need for state intervention when private costs diverge from social costs and
suggested that the solution would be to internalize the externalities through taxation.1 Coase
[4] criticized the proposed state intervention and affirmed that there is no reason to suppose
that governmental regulation is called for simply because the problem is not very well handled
by the market or the firm.
The ensuing debate has been conducted along these two opposite views: on the one hand, the
supporters of the idea that the choice of policy instruments is to be applied as a public matter
and the state, as policy designer, should select the optimal instruments and take responsibility
for their imposition in the public interest, but, on the other, the supporters of MB instruments
are trying to fight a battle against a sort of “anti-market” mentality based on a reluctance to
apply MB instruments [5].
So the problem would be to compare the instruments that can be considered public oriented
and those that can be considered market oriented, where the former is characterized by a public
agency that defines a conduct rule and provides an enforcement system and the latter is
characterized by instruments based on market mechanisms stimulating the conduct of the firm
indirectly and by a private administration and enforcement system.
1 See the documents of the “Pigou club” [3].
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Following an EAL approach, traditionally regulatory systems originate from the presence of
market failure: in our specific case, the environment appears as a “public good” that may not
be appropriated and has no market price; the damage to the environment is a case of “exter‐
nality,” in that it is fully or partly a social cost that is not internalized into the accounts of the
parties causing it.2 So the comparison of different instruments can consider how they may play
a role in correcting malfunction and subsequent inefficiencies [7].
In this way, we can move from the theoretical definition of the efficiency of different instru‐
ments to their practical, and so direct, potential to achieve concrete objectives. In particular,
the objectives that emerge as relevant in judging the practical efficiency of environmental
policies are the following: first is the prevention in the sense of providing incentives for firms
to improve safety standards, and second is the connection with technological change in the
sense of encouraging firms to adopt lower risk technologies.
The first kind of environmental instrument is the so-called CAC that is characterized by a
public agency that provides a definition of conduct rules and enforcement system. Thus, they
could be defined as public-oriented instruments, which require the use of a particular tech‐
nology or the observation of a performance standard, authorizing for the maximum amount
that a source can emit.
CAC is divided into two phases as follows: “command”, which sets a standard based on the
maximum level of permissible emissions, and “control”, which monitors and enforces the
standard.
Regarding standards, they can be classified into two: ambient standards, which fix a minimum
desired level of air or water quality or a maximum level of emissions that must be maintained,
and emission standards, which fix a maximum level of permitted emissions that can be
performance based, setting emission limits that each firm is allowed, or technology based,
specifying the best technology to be used.3
As to the US experience with this kind of regulation, the activity of the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) provides a clear example of regulation by an independent environ‐
mental authority. This agency performs its tasks through the setting of preventive standards,
the enforcement of polluting emission thresholds, and the performance of inspections and,
possibly, of actions brought to the federal courts. We cannot mention the European Commun‐
ity experience given that a standard setting system has not been established at a European
level (but at national level) and that the European Environmental Agency (EEA) has only a
very limited role.4
2 Economists consider environmental policies within the framework of the category of externalities, as evidenced by
Cropper and Oates [6]: “The source of basic economic principles of environmental policy is to be found in the theory of
externality.”
3 As Cropper and Oates [6] explain“…The determination of environmental policy is taken to be a two-step process: first,
standards or targets for environmental quality are set, and, second, a regulatory system is designed and put in place to
achieve these standards. This is often the environmental decision making proceeds. Under the Clean Air Act, for example,
the first task of the EPA was to set standards in the form of maximum permissible concentration of the major air pollutants.
The next step was to design a regulatory plan to attain these standards air quality.”
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The choice to develop a CAC regulatory system is based on the advantage of centralized
agencies to assure a cost-effectiveness calculation on the base of the expected damage and of
the marginal cost of different level of preventive care. The centralized structure presents the
advantage to provide a continual oversight of problems and a broad array of regulatory tools.
Following the traditional EAL approach, well-defined standards generate the correct incentive
for the firm to act with caution and make the best production and prevention decisions [8, 9].
CAC instruments use to be compared with MB instruments that are characterized by a private
administration and enforcement system and stimulate indirectly the behavior of the firm.
There are essentially two different types of those instruments: taxes that are fees imposed on
emitters proportionate to the total amount of emissions released into the environment (they
could be divided into emission charges, product charges, and user charges) and marketable
(or tradable) permit systems that provide a fixed number of permits equal to the allowed total
emissions, distributing them among polluting firms in a specific area.
The two types of MBI instruments can be seen in the following two different approaches: on
one side, taxes follow a price approach because producers adjust the quantity, given a fixed
price put on emissions; on the other side, a tradable permit system follows a quantity approach
because the price is adjusted according to supply and demand, given a maximum quantity of
emissions allowed.
3. Carbon tax versus tradable permit system
A carbon tax is a particular tax based on GHG emissions generated by burning fuels and
biofuels, such as coal, oil, and natural gas. It has been introduced with the main goal to level
the gap between carbon intensive (firms based on fossil fuels) and low carbon intensive (firms
that adopt renewable energies) sectors. Due to the introduction of that form of taxation, the
relative prices of goods and services will change; the emissions of intensive goods will be more
expensive, whereas the emissions of less intensive goods will be lower. Thus, carbon tax
provides a strong incentive for individuals and firms to adjust their conduct, resulting in a
reduction of the emissions themselves. Hence, by reducing fuel emissions and adopting new
technologies, both consumers and businesses can reduce the entire amount they pay in carbon
tax.
A tradable permit system is defined as quantity-based environmental policy instrument. The
regulatory authority stipulates the allowable total amount of emissions (cap) and the right to
emit becomes a tradable commodity. Under a cap-and-trade system, prices are allowed to
fluctuate according to market forces. Thus, the price of emissions is established indirectly.
Permits could be allocated to firms through auction or free allocation.
4 The EEA was set up as a legally independent community body under council regulation (EEC) 1210/90. The EEA’s core
task is to provide decisionmakers with the information needed for making sound and effective policies to protect the
environment and support sustainable development.
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Similarly to other environmental taxes, carbon taxes are defined as priced-based policy
instruments for the correlated effects to increase the price of certain goods and services, thereby
decreasing the quantity demanded. On the other side, tradable permits are defined as quantity-
based environmental policy instrument. Although both policy instruments are MB, their
implementation is different: carbon taxes fix the marginal cost for carbon emissions and allow
quantities emitted to adjust, whereas tradable permits fix the total amount of carbon emitted
and allow price levels to change according to market forces.
Which is better? There is no simple yes or no answer, and the policies are not necessarily
mutually exclusive. Several important advantages and drawbacks of the respective policies
are outlined later.
A well-functioning emission trading system allows emission reductions to take place wherever
abatement costs are lowest, regardless of international borders. As costs associated with
climate change have no correlation with the origin of carbon emissions, the rationale for this
policy approach is that an emission trading system allows to fix a certain environmental
outcome and the companies are called to pay a market price for the rights to pollute. This is
the reason why an emission trading system is suitable for international environmental
agreements, such as the Kyoto Protocol, specifically for the characteristic that a defined
emission reduction level can be easily agreed between states.
Emission trading is more appealing to private industry because, by decreasing emissions, firms
can actually profit by selling their excess GHG allowances. Creating such a market for pollution
could potentially drive emission reductions below targets.
A carbon tax would offer a broader scope for emission reductions [10]. A system of tradable
permits entails significant transaction costs, which include search costs, such as fees paid to
brokers or exchange institutions to find trading partners; negotiating costs; approval costs; and
insurance costs. Conversely, taxes involve little transaction cost over all stages of their lifetime.
Carbon taxes are dynamic economic instruments that offer a continuum incentive to reduce
emissions. In fact, technological and procedural improvements and their subsequent efficient
diffusion lead to reductions in tax payment. In addition, trading systems are able to self-adjust
because emission goals will be easier to meet; there will be a decrease in permits’ demand and
in their price but not as rapidly as taxes.
The implementation of an emission trading system is very complicated and requires technical
steps, including treatment of sinks, monitoring, and enforcement. On the other hand, taxation
is a very well-known instrument by policy makers, not very costly because it does not require
monitoring and enforcement organization.
The revenue from carbon taxes can be used into the economy to reduce income taxes or levies
on labor or capital investment. This may be part of a national or international reform of the
taxation systems with the effects to shift the tax burden from “goods” like labor to “bads” like
pollution.
In Table 1, we have summarized the main differences among CAC, carbon tax, and tradable
permit system.
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Command and control Carbon tax Tradable permit system
Certainty over CO2
price or cost? No
Yes. The tax establishes a well-
defined price
No. But price volatility can be
limited by design features, such
as a safety valve (price cap) or
borrowing
Certainty over
emissions?
No. Regulating the rate of
emissions, the level uncertain
leaves
No. Emissions vary with
prevailing energy demand and
fuel prices
Yes, in its traditional form. No,
with the use of additional cost
containment mechanisms
Efficiently encourages
least-cost emission
reductions?
No, but tradable standard is
more efficient than non-
tradable standard
Yes Yes
Ability to raise
revenue? No
Yes. Results in maximum
revenue generation compared
with other options
Traditionally no
Incentives for R&D in
clean technologies?
Yes and no. Standards
encourage specific
technologies but not Brod
innovation
Yes. Stable CO2 price is needed
to induce innovation
Yes. However, uncertainty over
permits’ prices could weaken
innovation incentives
Harm to
competiveness?
Somewhat. Regulations
increase the cost of
manufacturing, but, unlike
taxes of tradable permits, do
not raise the price of fossil
energy
Yes, though if other taxes are
reduced through revenue
recycling, competitiveness of
the broader economy can be
improved
Yes (as with a tax), but giving
firms free allowances offsets
potentially harmful effects on
profitability
Practical or political
obstacles to
implementation?
Yes. Setting the level of
standards is difficult
Yes. New taxes have been very
unpopular
Yes. Identifying a reasonable
allocation and target is difficult
New institutional
requirements? Minimal (unless tradable) Minimal
Yes, but experience with existing
trading programs suggests that
markets arise quickly and
relatively inexpensively
Source: Parry and Pizer [11].
Table 1. Command and control versus carbon tax versus tradable permit system
4. Insurance as an environmental policy instrument
A relevant role could be played by the insurance sector in the choice of political economic
instruments for climate change.
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As mentioned in Section 1, following the EAL approach, the emitters of GHGs externalize the
true costs of their contribution to climate change, and this implies the need to recover these
costs, which manifest through both the costs of impacts and the costs to prevent impacts.
Because the insurance sector is the world’s largest industry, the response of insurers to the
broader climate change challenge will no doubt be the key to, at least partially, solve this
internalization problem.
Generally, insurers can indirectly stimulate prevention behavior in their customers. In the case
of climate change, they can play two primary roles through their insurance products. The first
role is played in supplying and pricing traditional insurance coverage for damage deriving
from climate change by the promotion of actions of businesses and individuals to align policy
holders with climate-positive behaviors. The second is played in providing capital to new
ventures and reducing the financial risk to investors by facilitate the creation of new markets
and services that will help to solve the climate change problems.
In both the roles, insurance companies deal with the management of risk activities. In fact,
climate change risk is managed by the insurers through the risks they accept from clients, given
that climate change causes an increase in intensity and spreading the distribution of extreme
weather events with resultant effects on property claims that could be catastrophic.5
Traditionally, insurance is the main mechanisms available to individuals and business to
manage the financial consequences of risky events, such as natural hazards like windstorms
and floods. Insurance companies used to work making each individual or business pay a
premium to protect themselves against an uncertain loss. The premium is calculated by pooling
risks across a large and diverse population considering the pool’s expected losses.
In this way, the insurance industry provides a coverage for climate change consequences
because climate experts predict changes in the intensity and the distribution of extreme
weather events and of the resulting risk of catastrophic property claims.
But specifically, for what concerns the consequences of climate change, many problems arise
to provide insurance coverage [13].
First, climate change is connected to global weather patterns that may increase the potential
for losses so large. As more severe weather becomes more common and overall variability of
conditions increases, there is a threat for the solvency of insurance companies.
Second, because uncertainties in assessing climate change’s impacts are high and affect
property, casualty, business interruption, and health; as a result, risk has significant ambiguous
components and insurers are both likely to charge a significantly higher premium or avoid
insuring the risk entirely.
Third, climate change–related risks may be correlated and create a skewed risk pool that could
increase the probability of extremely large losses and also risks not well-distributed across
existing insurers.
5 Insurance coverage can be also connected with the liability system. But, for what concerns the consequences of climate
change, such as impacts of property damage from extreme weather events, the assignment of liability is a very complex
topic. See Reference [12].
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Finally, as a result of insurers’ uncertainty aversion and need to protect against extremely large
losses from single or related events, it is not clear that insurers will be willing to insure against
some climate change–related risks at a price that policy holders are willing to pay.
Climate change will affect, and in some cases is already affecting, most major types of insurance
products. Insurers will feel the impact of climate change on property and casualty insurance,
where the insurer bears the risk of a loss suffered directly by the policy holder. These property
and casualty claims include not only damage to insured property as a direct result of weather
but also claims for business interruptions and other consequences of weather-induced events.
Also, health and life insurers are going to face increasing costs.
Sometimes, insurance companies are involved in the systems of compensation fund that have
been established in some countries. This is the case of special government disaster funds within
the target to promote framework of contingency measures to cover the economic costs of
natural disasters [14].
Other insurance products are the so-called “financial responsibility” products. This term
includes the tools that require companies to demonstrate to have sufficient financial resources
for eventual future environmental damage that may arise through their activities. In its
common implementation, financial responsibility implies that a production activity is author‐
ized only if companies can prove that they will be able to financially cover economic claims,
for example, using surety bonds, cash accounts, deposit certificates, self-insurances, and
corporate guarantees.
In the past few years, the insurance industry has developed financial products suitable for
dealing with climate change-related risks in the direction to play a role far beyond simply
compensating climate change’s victims for their losses ex post. The activity of the insurance
has become relevant as a political economic instruments within an ex ante strategy to finan‐
cially manage large-scale catastrophes, as a complement of ex post instruments for the
compensation of disaster losses.
Insurance industry is also developing alternative risk transfer products, given that conven‐
tional reinsurance arrangements may in future cover a smaller proportion of total losses, and
there may be insufficient capital available to insurance markets to cover these losses [15].
A first kind of these insurance products are called “catastrophe bonds” and consist in securi‐
tizing environmental risks in bonds, which could be sold to high-yield investors. The catas‐
trophe bonds are able to transfer risk to investors that receive coupons that are normally a
reference rate plus an appropriate risk premium. By these products, insurance companies limit
risk exposure transferring natural catastrophe risk into the capital markets. In this way, with
the involvement of the financial markets, their global size offers enormous potential for
insurers to diversify risks.
Weather derivatives are another kind of financial instrument used by companies to hedge
against the risk of weather-related losses. Weather derivatives pay out on a specified trigger,
for example, temperature over a specified period rather than proof of loss. The investor
providing a weather derivative charges the buyer a premium for access to capital. If nothing
happens, then the investor makes a profit.
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With this kind of financial products, the insurance industry tries to reach two goals. First, there
is the need for extra capital and to spread risks beyond the insurance sector. Particularly, cat
bonds are used to spread insurance risk in the financial sector. The second goal is to improve
the accuracy and the resolution of hazard data and the likely impacts on climate change with
the involvement of financial market forecast ability.
The insurance industry can act to tackle the consequences of climate change by playing its part
in climate change mitigation, through the promotion of ways to reduce GHG emissions.
Insurers are also well placed to help society to adapt to the impacts of climate change, by
promoting the effective limitation and management of risks from extreme weather-related
hazards.
Individuals and companies that buy insurance products could be stimulated to address climate
change-seeking mechanism to facilitate mitigation of GHG emissions and adaptation to the
inevitable impacts of climate change [16]. In addition, the insurance companies themselves are
motivated to take significant actions to mitigate GHG emissions and increase adaptive capacity
to reduce overall uncertainty and other barriers to insurability and are also motivated to limit
the insurers’ potential exposure to catastrophic risks in excess of their capacity to avoid the
potential for property and liability claims in excess.
The insurance industry is also developing new products that would have the consequences to
stimulate the adaptation to climate change. On the one hand, products help to create the
conditions for active adaptation to build physically resilient communities; on the other hand,
products provide capital and liquidity to help communities to cope with losses caused by
climate change catastrophes.
Insurance products can be designed in a way for which simply their price reflects the level of
climate change-related risk assumed by the insurer. These products, rewarding behavior that
reduces risk of financial losses, encourage adaptive behavior. For example, insurance products
that incorporate these features provide a premium discounts on property insurance for
climate-resilient commercial or residential buildings.
The recent tendency to supply coverage with differential premiums to customers depending
on their level of protection from losses caused by weather-related disasters can be seen as a
clear opportunity for insurers to reduce their own overall and maximum possible loss exposure
while promoting communities overall resilience in the face of climate change’s impacts. So,
more often, policies include discounts for businesses or homeowners that have taken specific
steps to ensure their buildings resistant to floods or other hazards. Moreover, insurance
companies also condition their policies on compliance with laws such as building codes, thus
playing a role in enforcing laws that promote climate change resilience.
The second kind of insurance products that stimulate adaptation is based on the availability
of capital to cope with catastrophes. These are financial arrangements intended to bring needed
capital that will reduce the risk that could derive from future climate-related hazards for those
who are most likely to be in peril. These products can be defined as adaptation oriented because
they help to build the capacity of nations, communities, and businesses to cope with climate
change impacts.
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Figure 1 shows the different roles that can be played by insurance sector as a form of environ‐
mental policy instruments.
Source: MCII [17].
Figure 1. The different roles of the insurance sector in the framework of climate change consequences
5. Policies choice in the case of climate change and the concept of “economic
global public goods”
Dealing with the consequences of GHG emissions in terms of climate change implies a
definition of “economic global public goods” that can be defined as goods with economic
benefits that extend to all countries, people, and generations [18]. Following the EAL approach,
they are special case of externalities with a global dimension.
Climate is clearly “global” in both causes and consequences; moreover, the emissions of GHG
have effects on global warming independently of their location, and local climatic changes are
completely linked with the world climate system.
In addition, global warming is characterized by other important features that imply some
difficulties in the implementation of the instruments provided by the standard economic
theory of policy choice. First, we cannot determine with certainty both the dimension and the
timing of climate change and the costs of the abatement of emissions. Second, the effects of
GHG concentration in the atmosphere on climate are intergenerational and persistent across
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time. Finally, it emerges a relevant equity issue among countries because industrialized
countries have produced the majority of GHG emissions, but the effects of global warming
will be much more severe on developing countries. In other words, the countries that have
more responsibilities will face less consequence in the future and vice versa.
There are major governance issues involved in dealing with global public goods because global
coordination is required [19]. With economic public goods, it is difficult to determine and reach
agreement on efficient policies because they involve estimating and balancing costs and
benefits where neither is easy to measure and both involve major distributional concerns.
When dealing with economic public goods like global warming, it is necessary to reach through
governments to the multitude of firms and consumers who make the vast number of decisions
that affect the ultimate outcomes.
Because global warming is a global public good, the key environmental issue is global
emissions, and the key economic issue is how to balance costs and benefits of global emission
reductions. Climate change depends only on total GHG emissions and the time path of
emissions not on the geographic location of emissions. Moreover, the impacts depend
primarily on cumulative emissions that remain in the atmosphere not on the annual flow of
emissions.
It is a global issue to decide what the distribution of emission reductions among countries
should be and how the costs should be allocated, together with the need for differences among
high- and low-income countries, high- and low-emitting countries, and high- and low-
vulnerability countries.
Given the global nature of climate change, it is easy to understand the necessity of an action
at international level, in order to efficiently implement the different policy instruments that
we have analyzed earlier in this chapter.
First, the instruments based on tax mechanism need a method of coordinating policies among
countries. In the international environment, it could assume the form of either an international
tax or a harmonized domestic tax system. In the case of an international tax, the nations (and
not the firms) pay the tax to an international agency, which receives and redistributes the tax
revenues. On the other hand, in the case of harmonized domestic tax, the international
community should negotiate an agreed level of a domestic emission tax, establishing adequate
compensation for the losing countries from the gaining countries.6
Second, it is possible to establish an agreement that sets quantitative limits of emissions and
allocates emission permits to firms (or States) but allows to trade among countries, in order to
minimize abatement costs. The starting allocation of permits can be set through either an
auction or a grandfather allocation. Under an auction, government (or the international
community) sells the emission permits, whereas under the grandfather rule, the allocation of
emission permits is based on historical records.
6 Nordhaus [20] hypothesizes the institution of an harmonized carbon tax (HCM), essentially equivalent to a “dynamic
Pigouvian pollution tax for a global public good” and points out 10 different reasons to prefer it to a quantitative approach.
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In the global-warming context, quantitative limits set targets on the time path of GHG
emissions of different countries. Countries then can administer these limits in their own
fashion, and the mechanism may allow transfer of emission allowances among countries, as
is the case under the Kyoto Protocol.
The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS) – the world’s most extensive carbon
pricing market – has now been in operation for 10 years. The EU-ETS was developed as a way
of meeting the EU’s GHG emission reduction targets in the most efficient and cost-effective
manner. To do so, the EU-ETS sets a limit (a cap) on the total emissions; certain EU sectors
(mostly heavy industry and aviation) are allowed to use during predefined trading periods.
Permits are then distributed among polluters where one permit equals one ton of carbon
dioxide equivalent. These permits can then be traded between market participants. As such,
the total amount of pollution is set by an external authority, but market participants determine
the permit allocation, thereby optimizing efficiency.
In addition, the involvement of the insurance sector as an efficient policy instruments needs a
global approach.
Insurance sector can contribute to develop risk management strategy to minimize climate
change consequences on an urgent basis to prevent further escalation of global warming.
However, insurance needs to be a part of the overall policy of mitigation and adaptation that
aims at reducing the severity of many impacts that could result from climate change if current
adverse conditions prevail.
In order to organize their own operations to the new challenge, the insurance industry should
include climate change risk in its internal governance procedures, in line with the existing
financial corporate risk identification. To enable insurance companies to play a responsible
role in tackling climate change consequences, they require a reliable, transparent, and inter‐
national coordinated policy framework as well as long-term, appropriated GHG emission
reduction goals coordinated at an international level.
6. Final remarks: COP 21 and the issue of the linkage of different national
policies
In the COP 21 meeting in Paris at the end of the 2015, global climate policy has faced the tension
between the efficiency benefits of uniform global policy and national and regional variation
in tastes for differing policies. Although climate negotiations, going back to the framework
convention, have had a coordinated global policy as their goal, it could be that we will head
toward a less coordinated system of local, national, or regional policies.
In reality, as we have analyzed in the chapter, different countries are undertaking different
policies ranging from CAC to MB approaches, such as carbon tax and tradable permit systems.
Variations in policies, although catering to local tastes and preferences, can lead to substantial
inefficiencies, and the target will be to reach an optimal degree of policy homogenization.
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There is a large literature on the importance of linking economic policies to face GHG conse‐
quences [21].
Some authors argue that the basic approach underlying emission reduction credit systems like
the Kyoto Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) can be extended to create linkage oppor‐
tunities in diverse emission control systems in ways that do not necessarily suffer from the
shortfalls of the current CDM. Moreover, while emission reduction credit systems are designed
to work with MB systems like tradable permits, they describe ways in which it can interact
with tax systems as well as certain regulatory systems [22].
By clarifying the opportunities and challenges of insurance as an instrument for adaptation
and outlining a practical way forward, it is hoped that this discussion contributes to the
opportunities in adopting a comprehensive adaptation strategy that enables risk management
and insurance through the funding of a global adaptation strategy [17].
In the near future, the challenge for COP 21 to reduce GHG emissions is to try to link hetero‐
geneous climate policy instruments as a way to reach the solution of climate change issue in
the long term.
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